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DESECULARITZATION, NATIONAL STATE AND 
THE RISE OF RIGHT OF POLITICAL MOVEMENT
Abstract: Desecularization is the multilayered and the multifaceted concept. 
Around his determination created substantial di!erences exist, both among 
researchers and religion among people who are religious or atheists. In the 
most general sense, it means a return to religion (and religion) and its increas-
ing importance to the individual, social collectivities, institutions and the state. 
One of the more general attitudes is that desecularization not uniform, unam-
biguous and reversible process. It is in"uenced by numerous political, histori-
cal, cultural and other factors. #e paper analyzes the relationship between 
secularization, the nation and the nation-state in Europe today. In this way, 
explains the essence of the social, political, cultural and religious climate in 
which they arise, and strengthen right political movements. #e conditions for 
their operation are di!erent in some religious communities, and they them-
selves o$en use religious issues such values for that %ght (or they oppose). #e 
author, in a nutshell, is the essence of the ideology of the social movements, 
their relationship to the nation-state and European integration. #e emphasis 
is on the political right compared to the dominant religions and confessions, 
as well as new forms of expression of religious fundamentalism and political 
intolerance. #e conclusion is that religious exclusivity encourages the rise of 
the right, and it was further strengthened.
Key words: desecularization, Europe, the nation-state, the political right, con"icts.
Introduction
At the center of sociological analysis is the social, cultural and histori-
cal climate in which the processes of return to religion and religion, the 
decline of the national state (state-nation) and the rise and strengthening 
of the right political movements in today’s Europe are taking place. #ese 
processes are interconnected, and here, in brief, they describe and explain 
their most important dimensions. Processes of return to religion and re-
ligion are important for understanding the diversity of forms of religious 
practice of citizens, which under current conditions are exposed to many 
global and local in"uences. Among them, the globalization of economics, 
cultures and societies in general is of particular importance, with all the 
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consequences for the life of the individual and social groups. One of the 
most important trends is the con"ict of globalization and regionalization 
with national and local, which results in changes in the functions of the 
national state and religion in general.
#e relationship between them is very complex, so it is necessary to take 
into account all the speci%cities of the environment in which processes of 
desecuelization, globalization and. weakening national state. #e paper 
makes an e!ort to point out the basic social, historical and cultural causes 
that have contributed, among other things, to the strengthening of the right 
political movements and parties. In everyday life, this is re"ected in all the 
existing xenophobia, intolerance, Islamophobia, racism and violence among 
members of di!erent religions, confessions and religious communities (and 
atheists). #e current global economic crisis and the migrant crisis all com-
plicated it further and gave their seal. #e author starts from the view that 
it is necessary to have a better knowledge of di!erent religions and cultures 
in order to understand and tolerate the attitudes and behavior of Christians, 
Muslims, members of other religions and citizens who do not have them 
di!erently. On the case of Europe, the most important problems that they 
encounter can be noticed.
1. Desecularization in Europe
#ere are many de%nitions of the term desecularization. Researchers of 
religion, but also ordinary citizens, under this term, mean di!erent contents. 
#ey are o$en contradictory, and sometimes under the same term, the same 
content is implied. Of course, there is also diversity in terms that denote the 
essence of desecularization. Let’s just mention the return of religion (and 
religion), the revival of religion, the work of art and others. #is is where 
the ideas of some of the most in"uential authors in this %eld are missing.
Disagreements over the assessment of the start, dynamics, and dimen-
sions of this concept have not yet been seriously resolved. #e consequence 
is that the return to religion is linked to di!erent periods of social and eco-
nomic development, although there are cases when it relates to the begin-
ning of the 1990s. (Vrcan 1999; Blagojević 2005). #is also depends on what 
the main attention of the researchers is focused on and on what space. #e 
result is that there are desecularization studies in Europe, but also in other 
regions of the world (Berger 2008). Some of them relate to religion in gen-
eral, as a form of social consciousness and an element of culture. #e oth-
er deal with only some elements of religion, ranging from church institu-
tions to speci%c religious practice of individuals and social groups. #ere 
are those who are trying to synthesize theoretical and empirical analyses 
in this %eld in a fruitful way. It is rarer than it prevails among authors who 
study religion, religious practice, and even desecularization.
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It is important to note that there are disagreements among the researchers 
of religion about whether the secularization process is irreversible, or not.1 
Authors who dealt with changes since 1989 emphasized that there are clear 
tendencies of returning religion and religion and the “world”. #ose who 
study religion in other environments (as in the United States) have pointed 
to the revival of religion in other forms, that is, in the emergence and spread 
of new religious movements. In any case, it can be said that there is a diver-
sity of the manifestation of religious practice, but also the conclusions were 
drawn by those who study it. In this work, the polarization refers to the re-
turn to religion and religious practice that takes di!erent forms in di!erent 
environments and which are not once and for all given. #is is in"uenced, 
inter alia, by numerous historical, cultural, social, political and speci%c re-
ligious factors. One of the most general and most in"uential processes that 
contribute to and changes in this area is the process of globalization. More-
over, a review of de-education in Europe makes it easier for the research-
er to better understand the social and cultural climate in which other so-
cial processes take place. Among them, there is an increasingly signi%cant 
strengthening and the rise of the right political movements.
On the basis of the above, it follows that it is necessary to be careful in 
every research of religion, i. it is important that in the analysis the author 
devotes himself to the general and special characteristics of this phenom-
enon in the context of the humble environment in which it exists. One is 
researching the same processes in regions and countries that have under-
gone modernization processes (Western type, for example). It is complete-
ly di!erent when it comes to societies that have developed in other models 
of development, or belong to other cultures and civilizations. It is precisely 
Europe that di!ers considerably from patterns of socio-economic develop-
ment and religious processes from others, such as regions dominated by 
Islam, for example. Any overlooking of their speci%city and the di!erence 
leads to unilateral conclusions about the characteristics of social and reli-
gious opportunities in them.
Europe is characterized by, among other things, the fact that, since the 
French Revolution (1789), it has entered the path of secession of the church 
and state and the de%nition of secularism or laicism. #is is particularly 
dominant in France. In the Constitution of 1905, it has legalized the inde-
pendence of the church from the state and vice versa. #ese provisions and 
dans apply. In everyday practice, there are many examples when the state 
reached for measures that are contrary to those provisions of the constitu-
tion. #is seems, among other things, through the education system, but 
also by strengthening repression and applying physical force to citizens 
1 See more about the conceptualization of the secularization as uncertin, variable 
and reversible process in the papers of the following authors: Blagojević M. (2005; 
2015), Vrcan S. (1999), Radisavljević-Ćiparizović D. (2006; 2016).
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belonging to certain ethnic and religious groups. In other countries of Eu-
rope, the church-state relationship is di!erent. #ey are diverse in a religious 
sense. According to the model he proposed, there can be di!erent groups 
of states, which di!er in each other from the degree of widespreadness of 
certain religions and confessions (Davie 2005). In any case, it is important 
to bear in mind that Europe inherits both the Christian, dominating, and 
Islamic religious tradition and practice. Any attempt to analyze a religion 
that does not take this into account leads to unilateral conclusions about 
actual processes and events in speci%c environments.
2. Globalization and the national state
#e nation-state has lost a signi%cant number of roles during the contem-
porary (neoliberal) globalization of capitalism. #is is completely opposite 
to the international system established by the Westphalian Treaty (1648). 
According to him, the rightness of the nation-states, their independence, 
sovereignty, the right of nations to self-determination, is recognized, All 
national states are All national states are sovereign, equal, irrespective of 
the size and degree of economic and social National state is the main bear-
er of the sovereignty of nations, protection of citizens in a certain territory, 
where he applies laws and uses military force. Since then, the foundations 
of this system have been violated, and many countries have become victims 
of its collapse. Clearly, “strong” and “weak” countries can be distinguished. 
SURVEY #e inequalities between in economic, political and military power, 
they are more pronounced today than ever before. While the former has the 
power to impose their rules on sovereignty (economic, political, monetary, 
territorial…) and protect their “national” interests, others have mentioned 
the sovereignty and rights of preserving vital interests severely compromised 
by the former. For such a functioning of modern capitalism, there are dif-
ferent justi%cations, which are o$en quite opposite to most of the adopted 
international and national laws and rules.
Globalization itself is against the nation-state, because capital is ruining 
and endangering its foundations and boundaries. Only if a “strong” national 
state stands behind it is a means of realizing the interests of the most pow-
erful states and supranational communities, institutions and associations. 
#ese are the states of the capitalist center, with all their economic, politi-
cal and military power. When they decide to protect their interests, they do 
not hesitate either from military interventions, violent changes of power in 
other countries, and ignore the most important provisions of international 
law. Victims are almost powerless to resist it more seriously, and when they 
do so, they are o$en forced to renounce part of their national sovereign-
ty and identity. All this is followed by the growth of inequality in and be-
tween states and regions, in particular social fragmentation in weak states 
of the capitalist periphery. #ey are fueled by ethnic and religious con"icts, 
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which further create the focuses of the social and political crisis. #is o$en 
leads to the disintegration of society and the state, the creation of zones of 
long-term con"icts of warring parties, some of which are supported from 
the outside by the most powerful capitalist countries. #ere are numerous 
local and “indirect” wars, and the price of which is mostly paid to the citi-
zens of the state who is the victim of such actions.
In essence, wars are just one of the harshest means of protecting the in-
terests of the capitalist class, and without them, processes of desuvereniza-
tion of weak national states are carried out on a daily basis in various ar-
eas. #e likelihood that ethnic, religious and class con"icts will take place 
is greater if the position of the state is more important in the geostrategic 
distribution of military, political and economic power. #erefore, the big-
gest wars and con"icts are now taking place in areas rich in raw materials 
and minerals, or are important for domination and control on the strategic 
routes of transport of the most important fuels and raw materials. In the 
21st century, control of water resources has become increasingly important, 
and this is also an important factor in the emergence of new con"icts and 
wars. Some of them are also “indirect”, i.e. In addition to the local causes of 
the con"ict, the warring parties are directly encouraged by powerful forces 
from outside. #ese are “indirect wars”, involving powerful states, interna-
tional institutions, and organizations, supranational and regional economic 
and military alliances.
In all this, multinational companies play a major role, as their interests 
have merged with the interests of the capitalist class at the national and su-
pranational level of decision-making. Transnational companies (TNC) con-
trol most of the world’s trade, imports and exports, high-tech products, and 
(un) legally and (un) legitimately %nance political campaigns in the most 
powerful countries in the world. #ese interests could not be realized that 
large capital has no control over the most important institutions of the world 
monetary system and important international decision-making institutions 
(IMF, WTO, OECD, UN, G-20, and others). #e collapse of the sovereignty 
of national states is preceded by numerous actions, among which the eco-
nomic and %nancial weakening of the state is emphasized. Under the con-
trol of private interests and the aforementioned TNCs, the most important 
lenders, such as the IMF and SB, impose their interests and capital gains 
virtually lead the state to debt slavery.
To justify this, a neoliberal ideology serves, which is essentially the so-
called. Washington consensus. Its basis is the withdrawal of the state from 
economic life, deregulation, liberalization, reduction of customs barriers, 
free "ow of goods and capital, reduction of the public sector and acceler-
ated privatization. #is recipe was used by the IMF and the World Bank, 
in the same way, producing new areas and regions dependent on %nancial 
institutions and the most developed capitalist countries. #is, as a rule, re-
sulted in the rise in unemployment, poverty and inequality among citizens. 
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Deindustrialization itself meant destroying the material basis of society and 
the working class, greater dependence on foreign investment, loss of eco-
nomic sovereignty. In Serbia: “deindustrialization has led to the collapse of 
the largest part of the working class, as workers have lost their jobs. Poverty, 
mass unemployment, greater exploitation and social inequalities have come 
to them” (Новаковић 2016: 749). It led to: Demodernization of the society 
and weaking of all social movements, including the trade union movement, 
occurred as consequnces of deindustrialization (Obradović, Novaković 
2015:274). Dejan Mirovic’s %ndings on the changes in the economic and 
social structure in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that joined 
the EU a$er 1989 have shown that they all increased external debt, unem-
ployment, poverty, and reduced the population and material basis for the 
adoption of a national development policy. (Mirović 2013).
Research by world-renowned economists has proven that most of the 
economies that have been rapidly evolving over the course of 25 years have 
escaped such a fate. #ey have avoided the services of these institutions, re-
nounced the excessive market freedom and more used domestic %nancing. 
#ey did not resort to deregulation, liberalization and quick and general 
privatization, especially public goods. Moreover, these countries underesti-
mated the domestic currency, protected their economy with higher customs, 
invested more in public services (education, health, science) and had a nation-
ally loyal and dedicated ruling elite. By contrast, most transition countries 
and “weak” national states did not escape the in"uence of pseudo-%nancial 
institutions. In the region, only Hungary seriously opposed the services of 
the IMF, and the resistance of Slovenia lasted only until 2004. Members of 
the Commission for Growth and Development concluded that there is no 
single recipe for accelerated economic development, and the fastest grow-
ing economies of the world did not apply the most important elements of a 
neo-liberal doctrine (Душанић 2011).
Among the most important consequences of the neoliberal globaliza-
tion of capitalism the growth of economic and social inequalities, mass 
unemployment and poverty of citizens. According to Branko Milanovic’s 
research, economic inequalities in the world today are higher than before 
the global crisis, both among the most developed countries and underde-
veloped countries, and within each of them. #e place of birth determines 
with two weights the income of an individual and only 20% of the class 
and family a{liation of the family. Jozef Stiglic emphasized the causes and 
dimensions of the growth of inequality in the United States: “One percent 
of the richest Americans account for a quarter of the national income. If 
instead of income we consider wealth, one percent of the richest people 
control 40 percent of total wealth” (Stiglic, 2015: 93). #e average salary of 
workers is at the level of thirty years ago. #erefore Stiglic called that capi-
talism “surrogate capitalism” because it socializes debts while privatizing 
the pro%t (Stiglic 2015:98, 99). Toma Piketty pointed to trends in inequality 
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in the long run on the example of the US, France and the United Kingdom. 
#e increase in income from labor was in favor of the growth of income 
inequities in favor of the richest, while the purchasing power of employee 
salaries grew slower by 2010. (Piketi 264, 269, 312, 313). #e said countries 
are important for making the most important decisions in the EU, but also 
in NATO and the world. Recent Eurostat data con%rm the trend of inequal-
ity in the distribution of income in the EU. Namely, inequality of income 
is wider, and the top 20% of the top income pyramid has a 5.9-fold higher 
income than the 20% of the poorest in the EU. In Serbia, this ratio is even 
higher, amounting to 9.2: 1! (Vreme, 19 June 2015). #ere remains an open 
question for further analysis of the extent to which these inequalities in 
Serbia are due to the “crowning” of national sovereignty and the in"uence 
of the “international community”, especially the functioning of %nancial 
institutions (IMF, WB) and the dynamics of government borrowing.
Of course, %nancial borrowing is just one dimension of the weakening 
of the nation-state. It is preceded or followed by political, military, cultur-
al, religious, and ethnic “desuverenization”, which o$en leads to the loss of 
identity of individuals, social groups and wider collectivities. Serbia is an 
example of a country whose ruling elites highlight the goal of joining the 
EU. It is therefore important to point out the most important dimensions 
of the crisis of the European Union itself, which is a natural consequence 
of the neoliberal globalization of capitalism.
For the emergence of the EU, not only were the important economic in-
terests of the founder countries, but also the needs and interests of the stron-
gest capitalist power of the world (USA) to strengthen its political, econom-
ic and military in"uence in Europe and the world a$er the Second World 
War. #erefore, they strongly encouraged its creation, but also control it all 
the time in the most important aspects of development (especially military 
through NATO). #e general direction of the development of the EU over 
the past six decades has been a sign of globalization at the regional level 
and the neoliberal development of the last few decades. #is means that in 
the structure of this community, the principle of protecting the interests of 
the most powerful states of the Center is realized at the expense of less de-
veloped countries, especially those on its semi-product. At the time of the 
global crisis of capitalism, this is expressed every day as a con"ict of vital 
interests of powerful and powerless members, centers and peripheries, the 
north and south, the developed west and the poor East, %nancially powerful 
states and indebted states. Monetary policy is in the center of con"ict of in-
terest, both in the euro-zone and in other EU member states. Subsequently, 
con"icts of interest are compounded at the level of %scal, economic and re-
gional development policies, institution building and management systems, 
and all decisions in the %eld of national and regional security policy. #ese 
problems are deepened a$er 2008. #e EU has been “in"uenced by global-
ization and the global economic crisis by the in"uence of the IMF, WB and 
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USA” (Новаковић 2016: 279). #e current intercontinental migrant crisis 
has contributed to this. One of the consequences is the rise and strength-
ening of the right political movements
On the socio-political map of the EU, the most developed and power-
ful countries are distinguished, such as Germany and Great Britain. #e 
%rst is the importance of the geopolitical and historical circumstances of 
the Second World War for the United States, in all its ways, as a “piot state”, 
SOURCE important for the preservation of the interests of the most pow-
erful force in the world. #e other, as the former colonial power, remained 
an important factor in world politics, but also one of the most important 
allies of the United States. It got the same role as Germany. #ey are at the 
same time the most developed EU member states. #rough them, the in-
terests of the global capital of the less developed countries in and outside of 
this regional community are imposed. #e most plausible example of this is 
Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, which are directed by policies and measures 
of European and world %nancial institutions. #ese countries are the biggest 
victims of the EU’s neoliberal development and its institutional, legitima-
cy, democratic, demographic, political, moral and security crisis. #ey are 
at the periphery of the EU, the role of which is further impoverished, with 
the aim of further strengthening the power and wealth of the countries of 
the center of the region and the world. #ey are still in a di{cult situation 
with countries aiming to join the European Union. #is is also indicated by 
the processes of deepening economic and social inequalities in the center 
and at the periphery of the EU, but also unemployment and poverty. It is 
precisely this proof that this is a “globalization of poverty” as a logical con-
sequence of neoliberal capitalist globalization (Despotović, Đurić 2016: 85).
Every e!ort to create a single EU in the economic, political, social, cul-
tural and security sense faces systemic obstacles. #ey are in the foundations 
of the EU, the way this regional community emerged. Moreover, it is char-
acterized by a profound contradiction between the foundations on which it 
is based, the goals it is dedicated to, or proclaimed by them, and the actual 
way of functioning. On the one hand, unity, democratic decision-making, 
multiculturalism, protection of human rights, harmonization of the inter-
ests of all members have been proclaimed, while on the other there is a def-
icit of legitimacy and democracy, cultural, linguistic, ethnic and religious 
diversity that is seriously undermined. Namely, a multitude of national, re-
ligious, political, territorial, collective and individual identities are increas-
ingly confronting and revealing the systemic crisis of the EU. #is crisis 
is only one form of manifesting the crisis of the capitalist system as such.
#e most important decisions in the EU are not brought to the central 
institutions, but through (un) formal decision-making in the strongest states, 
among which the %rst place is occupied by Germany. #ese interests are es-
sentially aligned with the interests of the US and NATO, so deciding in the 
European Parliament, the European Commission and the European Council 
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is more protocol and formal than real. #e relationship between these in-
stitutions is o$en incompatible, and the legitimacy and democratic nature 
of the decisions they make are controversial. Namely, at the EU level, there 
is no institution of decision-making directly and democratically elected by 
EU citizens. Decision making is indirect, at a national level, displaced to 
a regional one. Hence its illegitimacy and undemocratic nature. In addi-
tion, there is a pronounced disparity in the in"uence and decision-making 
rights between big and small countries, old and newcomers. #e principle 
of “one citizen is one voice” is not applied, but it is a formal and real impo-
sition of the interests of the most populous and powerful countries to oth-
ers. #e work is “indirect democracy” or “façade democracy”, in which the 
worst are “weak states”.
#e self-proclaimed value of the EU peace project is drastically denied 
by military and other interventions on the soil of Europe and the world, in-
volving EU members (in particular Germany, France, Holland and Britain). 
#e EU is against all forms of discrimination, and in everyday practice it 
behaves quite the opposite. It also cares little about the solidarity within 
this regional community. #e best proof of this is the con"icting interests 
between the indebted countries and those who are not, and are the fate of 
the %rst (Greece and Germany for example). Pledge for a strong social state 
has long been a dead letter on paper. In Europe, the EU and the world, for 
many decades, the so-called “welfare state”. With the global economic cri-
sis, the uni%ed capitalist class makes it all the more di{cult and in various 
ways. In addition, the EU is incapable of ensuring the security of its citi-
zens, and by participating in NATO actions illegally and permanently vio-
lates the security and national sovereignty of many countries in the world. 
Some researchers link the EU crisis with events known as the “Arab Spring” 
(Gajić 2016: 79).
#ere is also an internal process of “crowning” the sovereignty of a nation-
state. It manifests itself, among other things, in lowering decision-making 
to lower local and regional as well as cross-border levels of decision-mak-
ing. #ey are multi-national imposed by the “Brussels administration” and 
the world’s %nancial and political organizations (STO, WB, UN). #ere are 
more than 50,000 classic bureaucrats in Brussels, who lobby for the inter-
ests of a large world, primarily %nancial, capital, on a daily basis. #ey do 
this in various ways, but mostly in favor of globalized capital. Even the UN 
o{cially and formally agreed that multinational companies have the right 
to in"uence beyond the borders of the nationalized countries of globalized 
capital. Behind them stands the national state, economically and militar-
ily strong, making it easier for them to act on the world market or a!ect-
ing them so that they can maximally exploit the dependent economies of 
the periphery of the system. Justi%cation is always found, even if it was the 
protection of national interests of strong states and the defense of democ-
racy and human rights.
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#e ideology of human rights, as well as multiculturalism, serve to justify 
the existing power relations and protect the interests of the richest coun-
tries in the world and even in the European Union. In the name of this, the 
applicable international norms are violated, and all nations and regions are 
subjugated. Events in North Africa, the Middle East of Syria and Central 
Asia have been largely created and assisted by the most in"uential NATO 
and EU members. In the interests of pro%t and large capital, “humanitar-
ian” military interventions, promote ethnic, religious, regional and other 
con"icts. #is is not foreign either to Europe, which by the bombing of the 
FR of Yugoslavia in 1999 violated the most basic principles of international 
law and basic human rights, and helped the processes of further fragmenta-
tion and disintegration of this country. What followed in other parts of the 
world is just a continuation of such a policy, largely created by the United 
States, with its most powerful allies in Europe, Britain and Germany.
In the majority of members of this regional community, the right, as well 
as extreme, political movements and parties have come to an end. Even be-
fore the onset of the global crisis, they existed, but they strengthened it, and 
some just formed. Some of them have had a long history that dates back 
to World War II (the National Front in France). Others were created later. 
#ere are those who formed a few years ago (PEGIDA or Patriotic Europeans 
against the Islamization of the Western world in Germany, created in 2014). 
In many cases, such movements have become more extreme, as has been 
shown in the current migration crisis. #ey all acted and acted at a certain 
stage of their development inside and outside the institutions of the system. 
#e rise in the political scene a$er 2012 is visible, both at the national and 
European level of decision-making. Such a thing would not have been pos-
sible, at least in such proportions, that the European le$ did not collapse 
for decades. #e causes of this are both national and regional and global.2
3. %e rise and consequences of the functioning of 
the right political movements in Europe
#e rise of the right political movements in the world has facilitated sev-
eral systemic and structural factors. More systemic and structural factors 
that facilitated the rise and rise of right political movements and parties. 
In Europe, the global economic crisis of capitalism and related inequalities 
and poverty, the changed attitude of the power of the main players to the 
geostrategic map of the world, and the crisis of the national state in the EU 
and beyond are highlighted by importance. #ese are the basic incentives 
2 According to Neven Cvetićanin: “… in France, Britain and Germany the le$-wing 
le$-wing situation against the right, and there is a visible con"ict between the cen-
ter and the margin, which begins to dominate the political %eld.” In: Cvetićanin 
N. (2008), Epoha s one strane levice i desnice, Služeni glasnik & Institut društvenih 
nauka. Beograd: 509, 510
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for reviving right-wing ideas and increasing right-wing movements. Many 
of them changed the tactics and forms of their actions, adapted to the new 
social conditions. Others emerged during the global economic crisis and 
experienced rapid success. #e current migrant crisis has further strength-
ened them in this endeavor, and they are all more solid and more inclined 
to perform together. #is is seen by the most important attitudes of their 
ideology, as well as everyday performances at the local, regional and Euro-
pean level of action. Here are the most basic elements of their ideology, i.e. 
the values  they are %ghting for. #en, brie"y, the most in"uential political 
genuine movements in some European countries are clari%ed. Finally, the 
characteristics of the social groups to which they are addressing are more 
and more. #ey also point to the way in which they work in and outside the 
national states, the means they serve in order to achieve their goals and the 
most important political and social consequences of their ascent.
#e basic values at the center of political programs and the actual func-
tioning of the right political movements are the following: anti-globalism 
and Euroscepticism, return to national state and security, racism, xeno-
phobia, Islamophobia, the preservation of Christian faith and European 
culture, against migrants and all other minorities and ethnicities. #ere 
are also special requirements arising from speci%c national and local envi-
ronments, which in the new conditions are highlighted in the foreground. 
Of course, it is illusory to expect the existence of a unique and consistent 
political program of the right political movements. As a rule, they adapt 
to newly emerging opportunities, and change or mitigate the radical goals 
of their parties, in order to formulate similarly, and sometimes even more 
radical ones, in new circumstances. On this occasion, we will focus on the 
most in"uential right political movements in Europe.
#e National Front in France has existed for decades. Its founder and a 
man who for decades was his leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, put the party in 
the foundations of the party for extremely conservative values  such as. His 
daughter, and the current leader, Marine Le Pen, changed some of the basic 
goals and in time adjusted the tactics of action at the national and Europe-
an levels. Among her demands are, among others, advocacy for return to 
decision-making at the national level, the abolition of EU institutions, the 
ban on the arrival of migrants, and especially Muslims. Hence her com-
mitment to return to national culture and values. In the heat of political 
struggle to win the best possible position in the structure of political power, 
Marine Le Pen stated: My goal is to destroy the European Union – not Eu-
rope.” (Vestinet, 21 December, 2015). Regarding her e!orts to occupy a bet-
ter place in the political system, the argument for migrants does not have 
enough jobs for the French. #e National Socialist Party’s biggest success 
was achieved in local elections in France in 2014 when it won 25% of vot-
ers’ votes. (Stojiljković 2014: 144). #e rise in the political power rank con-
tinued with the entry of the National Front into the European Parliament. 
Religion in Contemporary Society80
#ere, a group of right-wing movements of the EU became the largest po-
litical group. At the French National Front, the National Front took a high 
place, and Marine Le Pen won every fourth vote of elected voters in the 
presidential election.
Viktor Orban is Hungary’s prime minister and leader of the right-wing 
Fides party. In addition, there is an extreme right-wing party (Jobik, the 
leader is Gabor Vona) with radical racist and professorial attitudes. Dur-
ing the migration crisis, Orban clearly stressed the need to prevent the ar-
rival of migrants from the Middle East, North Africa and Asia. He pointed 
to the greatest weaknesses of the EU: the absence of democratic decision-
making, the power of informal decision-making by Germany and France, 
the inability to protect its own members of the community and its citizens, 
and the great dependence of the EU on the decisions of powerful states of 
the world. #eir concrete decisions during the migrant crisis, the need to 
protect national interests, Christianity, European culture and Europe in 
general. His statements and political moves came across di!erent echoes. 
#e most in"uential EU leaders condemned him, and a signi%cant number 
of new EU members (the so-called Visegrad Group) supported him and ap-
proved his behavior. #e great dissatisfaction of European leaders caused 
Viktor Orban’s decision to organize a referendum on migrants (early Oc-
tober 2016). Out of all voters, 39.9% came out of the referendum, and 98.2 
out of 98 voted against the migrants. For the success of the referendum, it 
was necessary to have 50% plus one voter at the polls. Although no posi-
tive decision was made, the referendum showed that the Hungarian society 
was deeply divided and a relatively large in"uence (B92 October 2, 2016).
Right political movements and parties in Austria have a long tradition. 
On the one hand, those who originated from the second world war. On the 
other, younger parties and political groups, who have become more active 
in the social and political scene of Austria in recent years. Particularly in-
teresting is that, at the beginning of the migrant crisis, Austria had a benev-
olent attitude towards the newcomers. Public and massive welcome rallies, 
all in the name of humanism and respect for human rights. As migrations 
became more massive, and Orban’s policy sharper and more exclusive to 
them, the position of the o{cial representatives of Austria changed. For-
eign ministers’ councils (Christian Kurz) have come to the conclusion that 
migrants are not allowed to enter the European mainland and that recep-
tion centers for migrants are created in northern Africa (Libya). Like Hun-
gary and Austria, Schengen has su!ered and some of the EU’s basic values 
(freedom of movement for people, for example). On the political scene in 
Austria, the most conservative views were made by the Austrian Liberal 
Party leader Hans Christian Strahan. He advocated the abolition of the EU 
and the return to the values of the national state. It is interesting that the 
in"uence of the right movements is relatively high, such that the symbolic 
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majority in the presidential election of 2016 won their opponent’s candidacy 
(Norbert Hofer and Van der Belen).
Among the right-wing parties, Freedom is the most in"uential in the 
Netherlands, and the leader is Gert Wilders. In the %rst place, he empha-
sized anti-migrant attitudes, xenophobia and Islamophobia. #e sign of 
the right-wing movements and parties is not exhausted. In Norway and 
Sweden, their in"uence is relatively small, and there are little representa-
tion in the parliament. ISOUS and Names All they have used the existing 
EU problems to emphasize the need for its abandonment and antimigrant 
behavior. He thinks that the UKIP UK (the UK Independent Party, Nigel 
Faraga’s leader) has been overwhelmingly convinced that he has contribut-
ed decisively to “Brexit SOURCE. He, along with many other factors, con-
tributed to such a result of the referendum in the UK. A special interest is 
that the anti-immigrant and right-wing movements in the most indebted 
EU members are relatively weak. In this way, they deny the belief that high 
indebtedness, unemployment and poverty lead directly to the strengthen-
ing of the right political movements.
Right-wing movements in Europe and right-wing leaders address most 
of the citizens who are disappointed with the policies of national and Eu-
ropean elites, job losers during the global economic crisis, unemployed cit-
izens and groups a!ected by austerity. If the unemployment rate is high, it 
focuses on the unemployed. It then emphasizes the bad attitudes of the ar-
rival of migrants, but also of the existence of the euro as a currency. #ere 
are also other social groups who are sympathizers or right-wing voters. #ese 
are those who are against minority groups (Roma, foreigners, members of 
other people, ethnicity, religion and culture).
In short, the global crisis, changes in the geopolitical map of the world 
and the multiple crises of the European Union are the dominant incentive 
factors for the rise of right-wing movements and parties in Europe. #ey 
have achieved signi%cant results at the local, national and European levels. 
In some countries, they entered parliament in 2012, and in 2014 they be-
came the largest group in the European Parliament (Stojiljković 2014: 139). 
A signi%cant contribution has been made by populism, used both in its day-
to-day operations and in the political institutions of its countries and the 
European Union.
Conclusion
#e text summarizes the basic interpretations of the concept of deseca-
lization as a process that has been happening in the last few years in Eu-
rope and the world. It was pointed out the most important di!erences in 
the estimates of this process by the most in"uential authors. #en it was 
pointed out the connection between religious and other con"icts with the 
processes of globalization in Europe, especially in the European Union. It 
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was emphasized that these processes are not one-way and unambiguous 
and that it is necessary to take into consideration numerous determinants, 
from historical, cultural, religious to speci%c national and local. #e desic-
cation trend in Europe is mentioned and brie"y described, which has long 
since emphasized that the church is separated from the state. In the case 
of France, it has been clari%ed that there are signi%cant contradictions and 
con"icts between the state and the church, and that the authorities use ma-
ny areas and resources (from the education system to the public order and 
security authority) to impose their interests. In other countries, the situa-
tion is di!erent, especially in the central and eastern European countries of 
the EU. #eir leaders, during the current global economic crisis and mass 
migration to Europe, have clearly opted for racism, Euroscepticism, Islam-
ophobia, and the strengthening of security structures at the national level.
#e central part of the text is dedicated to the attitude of the globaliza-
tion and national state. #en, on the example of the EU and its systemic 
crisis, it is shown on concrete examples. In the end, the basic social values 
that the right political movements and the social groups to which they are 
addressing are advocated. It was concluded that the rise of the right politi-
cal movements was backed by the crisis of the neo-liberal model of capital-
ism, the altered relations of forces on the geopolitical map of the world and 
Europe, and mass migrations from North Africa, the Middle East, Syria, 
Afghanistan and Central Asia. Old and new right political parties are rep-
resented as rescuers of the most vulnerable social groups, defenders of the 
national state and sovereignty, protectors of Christian values  and a factor 
that will give citizens greater prosperity than the ruling national and Eu-
ropean elites do. Populism is the most frequently used means of persuad-
ing its own membership and potential supporters. #ey do it outside and 
through the institutional system, but now everything is more solid and more 
persistent. #e same processes are characteristic, but to a lesser extent, in 
the developed Scandinavian countries, which are one of the most desirable 
places for the current migrants to move.
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